[tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jan 17 22:22:29 UTC 2018


#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery-  |  Actual Points:
  prop247-controller, review-group-30            |
Parent ID:  #9001                                |         Points:
 Reviewer:  asn                                  |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  SponsorV-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 For commit 6b14e46d:

 s/canibalization/cannibalization/ in the commit message

 I think I mentioned this in an oniongit comment too, but: in the user- and
 outward-facing text, we should say onion rather than hidden. We've been
 saying onion even in the code guts too lately, but that's less critical.

 I agree with Nick's point that in the man page, we should be clear about
 what is a hidden service circuit, and we should also give the user some
 guidance about why/how/whether to set these things -- if we don't, we run
 the risk of strange cargo cult instruction documents starting to float
 around, with people insisting that "HSLayer2Guards {ru}" is the only way
 to be safe.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13837#comment:37>
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