[tor-bugs] #24782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Jan 8 17:32:05 UTC 2018


#24782: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value
---------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                 |          Owner:  ahf
     Type:  defect               |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium               |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                       |         Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:                       |        Sponsor:
---------------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by dgoulet):

 We could also explore the possibility for that value to be a moving target
 at runtime. It is a bit more dicy and complicated but because Tor at
 startup looks at the "Total memory" instead of the "Available memory" to
 estimate that value, things can go badly quickly if 4/16 GB of RAM are
 available which will make Tor use 12GB as a limit... and even with a
 fairly good amount of swap, this is likely to be killed by the OOM of the
 OS at some point.

 On the flip side, a fast relay stuck with an estimation of 1GB or 2GB of
 RAM that Tor can use at startup won't be "fast" for much long before the
 OOM kicks in and start killing old circuits. It is difficult to tell what
 a normal fast relay will endure in terms of RAM for Tor overtime but so
 far of what I can tell with my relays, between 1 and 2 GB is usually what
 I see (in non-DoS condition and non-Exit).

 I do believe right now that the network is still fairly usable because we
 have big Guards able to use 5, 10, 12GB of RAM right now... Unclear to me
 if firing up the OOM more frequently would improve the situation but we
 should be very careful at not making every relays using a "too low amount
 of ram" :S.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24782#comment:5>
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