[tor-bugs] #17945 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Feb 26 17:30:37 UTC 2018


#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web, tor-hs, 029-proposed, 029   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  -teor-no, needs-design, needs-proposal-maybe,  |
  single-onion, review-group-33                  |
Parent ID:  #24962                               |         Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn, teor                            |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:48 teor]:
 > Also, can we do the whole HS protocol at once:
 > * intro point v2 and v3: close the HS INTRODUCE side if both sides are
 directly connected (#22689)
 > * HS v2: refuse descriptor uploads if the service is directly connected
 (#22688)
 >   * we can't refuse direct descriptor downloads, because Tor2web uses
 them
 > * HSv3: refuse descriptor uploads and downloads if the client or service
 are directly connected (#22688)
 >

 Hmmm. Kinda naughty to dump all this so late in the process. I don't think
 this can be 033 material, but perhaps we could consider it for 034. I
 liked dgoulet's patch because it was super simple and did the thing, but
 this new patchset is too complicated IMO.

 Particularly commit `10290066c8` and `connection_dir_is_anonymous()` is
 way more complicated than anything I would hope to see in this ticket.
 It's untestable, requires super deep knowledge of Tor's internals and is
 called by multiple dir entry points...

 My suggestion is to go with something simple for now (maybe dgoulet's
 branch or nothing at all) if we want to go for 033, and then in Rome we
 should try to think hard of how exactly we want to treat and support 1-hop
 clients/services, and design the appropriate patchsets with calm.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:51>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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