[tor-bugs] #21549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Dec 18 08:04:17 UTC 2018


#21549: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues
--------------------------------------------+--------------------------
 Reporter:  gk                              |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  task                            |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser        |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                          |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201809  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                  |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                  |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:16 legind]:
 > Relevant to HTTPS Everywhere, which would like to rewrite portions of
 the code in WASM for better performance: https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/issues/17143.

 I think we could bypass the investigation for HTTPS Everywhere (and
 extensions in general) at least by assuming it belongs to privileged code
 (which it does) and that the linkability etc. concerns only applies to
 content (which I think is not unreasonable). The idea then could be to
 implement a switch to being able to disable WASM and similar things
 (ASM.js comes to mind) for content only while leaving chrome like code
 untouched.

 Or maybe the chrome/content separation already exists and WebExtensions
 are just not properly added to the chrome bucket?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21549#comment:17>
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