[tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Apr 27 15:23:14 UTC 2018


#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem
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 Reporter:  maqp                        |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                      |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High                        |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                        |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                |        Version:
 Severity:  Major                       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                              |         Points:
 Reviewer:                              |        Sponsor:  Sponsor8
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Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `bug25939_034_01`.
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/63

 Three commits in there. First one is to support a rescan of the event list
 from the unit tests without it being initialized. Most unit tests don't
 need to deal with this list.

 Second commit is the fix for which I took the approach of rescanning the
 event list down in the stack instead for instance from the control port
 `ADD/DEL_ONION` command. The reason is that I wanted to avoid any future
 changes to bother with enabling the event. Bottom line is that if we have
 a service in our global map, the event *needs* to be enabled, period. One
 can argue here that we could instead implementa  way to only enable the
 HS_SERVICE role event(s) instead of fully rescanning the list? Like a
 `periodic_event_enable_by_role(r)` call?

 Third commit is a unit test.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25939#comment:5>
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