[tor-bugs] #23978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write simulator to evaluate security of Prop247 parameter choices

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Apr 23 11:56:34 UTC 2018


#23978: Write simulator to evaluate security of Prop247 parameter choices
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry                            |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  task                                 |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-prop247-experiments  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  SponsorV-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:3 mikeperry]:
 > Some issues I've noticed:
 > 1. guard.is_targeted should be updated every time we change guards in a
 higher layer

 Hmm, we are supposed to do this in `self.is_targetted =
 self.is_targetted_func()` when we instantiate a new guard node... Logic
 seems solid, but code might be broken. Will look more into this.

 > 2. The graphs of G1 look suspicious (high CDF in low timescales for
 wimpy adversaries)

 Hmm, I just pushed a commit that should improve the situation here. Now
 the CDFs look more close to what they should be. But there are probably
 more bugs!

 > 3. The "none" adversary still takes a long time. Can we have a mode of
 the sim that stops at guard discovery for particularly weak adversaries?

 Still haven't done this one yet!

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23978#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list