[tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun Sep 17 19:47:24 UTC 2017

#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  reopened
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE,    |  Actual Points:
  prop259, SponsorU-deferred, QUICKANT           |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  large
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:46 cypherpunks]:
 > The suggestion that *I* should use Snowflake entirely misses the point
 here: I'm trying to get Tor to make *all* users more uniform, so that we
 all have an anonymity set to blend in to!

 There were two problems you seemed to be interested in, 1) finding
 something that suits your needs (you're using Tor, right?), 2) finding out
 whether the proposed fix for this ticket was sufficient. My earlier
 comment was related to the first issue only.

 > How many Snowflake users do you think there are in my city? I would
 guess that there are not a lot. Also, from reading #21312, it doesn't
 sound like Snowflake is quite production-ready anyway.

 You're misunderstanding how Snowflake operates: From a local network
 observer frame of reference, you first connect to some domain front, then
 you connect to one of the many short-lived Snowflake bridges, and its
 fingerprint looks like WebRTC. What may distinguish Snowflake for your
 situation is that the IPs you'll connect to will change **a lot**.

 Again read the documentation to see whether it would suit your needs:

Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:48>
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