[tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Sep 14 17:00:09 UTC 2017


#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE,    |  Actual Points:
  prop259, SponsorU-deferred, QUICKANT           |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  large
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:40 cypherpunks]:
 > Hi isis, I'm again reopening this ticket because the fundamental problem
 in the title and description ("set of guard nodes can act as a linkability
 fingerprint") remains unfixed.
 >
 > I just checked a friend's laptop (Debian stable, tor 0.2.9.11-1~deb9u1)
 and when it got online it immediately connected to four guards. I don't
 know why, but I suspect it's because (like most laptops) it is sometimes
 not connected to the internet. (Some time later, it remained connected to
 two of them.)

 Sorry but that doesn't disprove what Isis said, Prop271 was implemented in
 Tor 0.3.0.x and not 0.2.9.x which your laptop's friend had.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:41>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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