[tor-bugs] #23507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add single onion unreachable address algorithm to prop224

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Sep 13 23:48:23 UTC 2017


#23507: Add single onion unreachable address algorithm to prop224
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  teor     |      Owner:  (none)
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
    Component:  Core     |    Version:
  Tor/Tor                |   Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224, tor-hs, single-
     Severity:  Normal   |  onion, ipv6
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:  #23493
       Points:  0.5      |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Here is how we make IPv6 (and other unreachable addresses) work with
 single-hop client and service connections to intro and rend points. It
 works for v2 single onion services. We talked about it for v3, but it
 never made it into the prop224 spec.

 Here are the steps:

 0. The service chooses and connects to the intro point (possibly using a
 3-hop path if it is a single onion service and can't reach it directly)
 1. The service always puts IPv4 and IPv6 in its descriptor link specifiers
 (if they are available in directory documents)
 2. If the link specifier has a reachable address, and the service is not a
 single onion service, a Tor2web client (currently v2 only) can use it to
 make a direct connection to the intro point
 3. Otherwise, the client connects over a 3-hop path via one of its
 reachable entry nodes

 The process for client rendezvous is similar, but if the client knows that
 the service is a single onion service, it *must* connect to the rend point
 using a 3-hop path. (Again, this only matters for Tor2web, which is v2
 only).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23507>
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