[tor-bugs] #23126 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSDirs should publish some count about new-style onion addresses

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Sep 4 11:53:56 UTC 2017

#23126: HSDirs should publish some count about new-style onion addresses
 Reporter:  arma                                 |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra,      |  Actual Points:
  research                                       |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:

Comment (by asn):

 So a very very basic statistic here that would give us an idea of the
 adoption of HSv3 services could be:

 a) When a time period completes, every relay '''publishes the number of
 HSv3 blinded keys''' it saw during the previous time period in its extra-
 info desc. Relays also add some laplace noise to obfuscate the original
 number. Time periods start at 12:00 UTC and last 24 hours, so relays can
 publish this statistic once per day.

 b) After we have received all descriptors containing stats from a specific
 time period, we add all the ''unique blinded key counts'' together, and
 publish the aggregate count. We add everything together to remove the
 laplace noise, and also to get a final graphable number. Unfortunately,
 that final number is not the number of unique HSv3 services since HSes
 publish their HS on multiple HSDirs under the same blinded key. However
 this number is definitely related to the number of unique HSes, by
 noticing how this number moves over time, we can certainly spot adoption
 rates of HSv3 services.

 This is a very basic stat that could help us here. Furthermore, we can
 then deploy similar analysis to what we did for the unique v2 .onion
 counts, to weed out the duplicate HSes so that we get a more accurate
 number. And I guess we can use privcount etc. to get an even more accurate

Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23126#comment:3>
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