[tor-bugs] #19926 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous desc :*

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#19926: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous desc :*
-------------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks              |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                   |         Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High                     |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor             |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal                   |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug, regression, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                           |         Points:
 Reviewer:                           |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Well, I don't know. I was that user who reported it in tor blog recently
 and who wrote 2 comments after gk reopened the ticket.


 > A connection in the `RENDDESC_WAIT` state can only get out of that state
 if the descriptor actually arrives at the client or if the SOCKS
 connection is closed.


 I don't know, but... can it be triggered by my `iptables` rules? It is
 well known that `iptables` is too buggy with `--owner` option. It blocks
 many valid packets because of so many reasons... that nobody wants to fix
 them all yet. In my case it is the case too, so I manually block these
 extra packets that do not pass `iptables` anyway. Normally this blocking
 has no effect on any application, but I cannot sure that. If HS is
 accessed many times, some attempts are interrupted and too many fails...
 does it mean that SOCKS connections can be sometimes suddenly interrupted
 and closed?

 I would like to see more detailed tor log options, that will give more
 information about what happens, but which is not so detailed as `info`,
 because `info` gives too much irrelevant information and that information
 cannot be shared because it contains sensitive information. Ideally I
 would be glad to see debug-level logs which can be safely shared with tor
 community without disclosing my tor chains, my guards, and HS I visit.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19926#comment:27>
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