[tor-bugs] #20212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

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#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources
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 Reporter:  gacar                     |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery           |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by mikeperry):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Unlike the generic or custom-built Tor client case (CDNs and status
 pingers will likely customize their Tor client for performance), Tor
 Browser specifies a SOCKS username and password for url bar domain
 isolation. When this u+p is set, we should be able to safely limit the
 number of onion hostnames for a single SOCKS username + password to some
 low number (5? 10?).

 Do we need a separate limit if third party hidden services are malicious
 and deliberately fail either HSDIR, IP, or RP attempts in a way that
 causes the client to retry them? Maybe there should be a total rend
 circuit limit per SOCKS u+p?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20212#comment:5>
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