[tor-bugs] #23856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Oct 24 07:36:01 UTC 2017


#23856: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours
-----------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor             |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect           |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High             |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor     |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal           |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                   |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                   |        Sponsor:  SponsorQ
-----------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 karsten]:
 > > We briefly talked about this in Montreal and agreed that it's probably
 a good idea. What are the next steps?
 >
 > We change the code and potentially backport as a security issue.

 Okay. Let's first consider all possible consequences before doing so.

 > > What potentially bad consequences did we overlook? How do we find out?
 Who do we ask?
 >
 > How does metrics handle a network where some relays report every 6
 hours, and others report every 24 hours?

 In theory this should be fine, and it already had to handle the case of
 some relays reporting every 15 minutes and others every 4 (not 6!) hours.

 But we can try this out by rewriting some descriptors and feeding them
 into the various metrics parts.

 > Do we need to remove some of the graphs from atlas, because they won't
 have data any more?

 Yes, we'll want to do that as soon as more and more relays switch over to
 reporting every 24 hours.

 > I can't imagine any other consequences.

 Okay!

 > > teor, do you think it would make sense to send a short summary of our
 Montreal discussion to tor-dev@, suggest our plan there, and ask for
 feedback? Or is that too much?
 >
 > Yes, that seems sensible. Did you want to do that, or should I?

 Would you mind doing it? I think you can describe the guard discovery
 attack better than I could.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23856#comment:5>
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