[tor-bugs] #23756 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor's .gitlab-ci.yml is doing mirroring? why?

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Oct 4 13:26:08 UTC 2017


#23756: tor's .gitlab-ci.yml is doing mirroring? why?
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  isis          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by catalyst):

 I would like to add that we should consider the variety of different
 automated processes that will interpret our `.gitlab-ci.yml` now that we
 have published it, not all of which share the same goals.  These include
 (but are not limited to):
 * The network/tor.git on our own self-hosted gitlab
 * Network team members' repositories on our own self-hosted gitlab
 * People's repositories on gitlab.com (or maybe some of them also self-
 host)
 Keeping an official (read-only) mirror on oniongit has different
 requirements than a developer keeping their forked repo in sync with
 upstream.  Some developers might be OK with the risk of having their
 branches clobbered by a force-push of the upstream ones; others might want
 to confine those to an `upstream/` namespace.  (It looks like the
 gitlab.com mirroring does both the `upstream/` namespace and maybe some
 conflict-detection for the unqualified branch names?)  Some might want to
 do all their upstream repository synchronization manually.

 Requiring the setting of some (well-documented!) CI variables in the
 repository before doing mirroring might be a good idea.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23756#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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