[tor-bugs] #23863 [Core Tor/Tor]: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should mark some dead

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Nov 16 04:07:55 UTC 2017


#23863: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should
mark some dead
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                               |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                             |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                             |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                               |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                       |        Version:  Tor:
                                               |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal                             |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969                             |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                     |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 Sebastian]:
 > Load on dirauths is extremely light right now IMO. Having clients
 contact dirauths would be bad, but having relays contact dirauths early
 and a bit more aggressively (and maybe having dirauths ultra-aggressively
 try every other dirauth) doesn't sound like the end of the world to me. I
 am currently seeing less than 3MB/s (averaged over 30 second intervals)
 peak outgoing bandwidth on my dirauth which is basically negligible.

 I am not sure we can have relays try fast enough to make sure this bug
 never happens on clients. That would cause issues every hour from about
 hh:00 to hh:01.

 Why don't we have clients remember where they got the consensus, and try
 it for any missing microdescs before trying an authority?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23863#comment:5>
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