[tor-bugs] #24050 [Core Tor/Tor]: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.

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#24050: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.
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 Reporter:  arma                        |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                      |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                        |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                              |         Points:
 Reviewer:                              |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Let's say we're using Tor Browser to visit a website with embedded content
 (images, scripts, etc.) from various third parties. Each domain needs a
 DNS resolve of course. Now, if at some point a stream times out for any
 reason, the circuit is closed and we start using a new circuit. Doesn't
 that mean we need to resolve all of our domains over again?

 So from Tor Browser's point of view, it seems we would have a performance
 benefit (not sure how significant) from a client-side DNS cache keyed by
 first-party domain. Just as the content cache and other stqte in the
 browser is first-party isolated. In the tor proxy, the Tor Browser
 indicates the first party domain via SOCKS credentials. Then, for a given
 website, even when we switch circuits, we still have the domain->IP
 mappings.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24050#comment:2>
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