[tor-bugs] #17069 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use false SNI fields, DNS requests for all outgoing connections to cdn-hosted websites

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#17069: Use false SNI fields, DNS requests for all outgoing connections to cdn-
hosted websites
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 Reporter:  elypter                   |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Low                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                            |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by dcf):

 nickm is right, that elypter's suggestion wouldn't be expensive the way
 meek is. It's not related to bridge blocking; rather it's about
 surveillance by the exit node.

 The idea of having a local database of which web site is on which CDN, and
 dynamically fronting through some other site on the same CDN as you
 browse, has some academic papers and a prototype implementation.
  * https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Holowczak2015a
  * https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Zolfaghari2016a
  * https://github.com/CacheBrowser/cachebrowser
  * https://cachebrowser.net/

 I don't think this proposal is really related to Tor, but if someone wants
 to try it, it might be possible to integrate the
 [https://github.com/CacheBrowser/cachebrowser-firefox cachebrowser-
 firefox] extension with Tor Browser.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17069#comment:8>
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