[tor-bugs] #17069 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use false SNI fields, DNS requests for all outgoing connections to cdn-hosted websites (was: use domain fronting for all outgoing connections to cdn hosted websites)

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#17069: Use false SNI fields, DNS requests for all outgoing connections to cdn-
hosted websites
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 Reporter:  elypter                   |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Low                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                            |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: very long term =>


Comment:

 Hang on, does this need to be an expense we bear?  What if we only did
 this for cases where we are already connecting to some site on a CDN?
 That is, what if somehow had TorBrowser able to notice that it was going
 to connect to some CDN-hosted domain, and instead of putting that domain
 in the SNI field of the TLS handshake, it used a generic one instead?  If
 that worked, it wouldn't bring any additional cost to Tor.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17069#comment:6>
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