[tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon May 15 12:07:04 UTC 2017


#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
-----------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                    |          Owner:
     Type:  defect                 |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                   |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor           |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                 |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                         |         Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:                         |        Sponsor:  SponsorU
-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:13 s7r]:
 > asn: you could be right with the second theory. Maybe the descriptors
 that need to be fetched are not even available, because the guard is not
 running in current consensus. This is based on a log analysis I just did
 now:
 >

 For the record, the theory is that since primary guards is just an ordered
 subset of guards that have been used in the past, there is no guarantee
 that the primary guards are currently online or in the consensus. Hence,
 this can occur naturally if your primary guards or bridges are offline.

 I'm not sure if this is the only possible way that our logic can introduce
 big bootstrapping delays, but it seems like a plausible one.

 Perhaps to address this for the non-bridge case, we should count a primary
 guard descriptor as missing (for the purposes of
 `guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits()`) only if that
 guard is present in the consensus. For the case of bridges, it might make
 sense to relax or disable our dir info requirements completely.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21969#comment:15>
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