[tor-bugs] #18589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser writes SiteSecurityServiceState.txt with usage history

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Mar 27 17:05:43 UTC 2017


#18589: Tor browser writes SiteSecurityServiceState.txt with usage history
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks               |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High                      |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Major                     |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak             |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by gacar):

 Although the number of preloaded STS sites is small, popular STS sites are
 more likely to be included in the preload list:

 || '''Site rank''' || '''# of preloaded STS sites[[BR]]/[[BR]]# of STS
 enabled sites''' ||
 || Top 10 || 33% ||
 || Top 100 || 24% ||
 || Top 1K || 16.5% ||
 || Top 10K || 12.5% ||
 || Top 100K || 8.5% ||
 || Top 1M || 4.7% (1883/39408) ||

 Anyways, I think the privacy risk of revealing browsing history still
 outweighs the potential security benefits.

 PS: I should also note that I couldn't completely reproduce the problem
 with 6.5.1 and 7.0a2 on Linux 64. Although I visited several sites that
 send HSTS headers, only a few TPO and AMO-related domains
 (aus1.torproject.org, www.torproject.org, aus1.torproject.org) added to
 the SiteSecurityServiceState.txt  (something to do with the chrome vs
 content connections?).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18589#comment:12>
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