[tor-bugs] #21594 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden Services with many intro points delay checking circuits on startup

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Mar 3 01:55:09 UTC 2017


#21594: Hidden Services with many intro points delay checking circuits on startup
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor          |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs        |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #21446        |         Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 dgoulet]:
 > Oh wow, that is a good find! So 10 was the maximum before and I bet it
 was considered to be that value because of "3" intro points. Which means,
 we would allow two rounds of intro point circuit connection because 3 + 2
 (extra for performance).
 >
 > Following that, I think it would be wise to do something like that which
 is at the very least do a retry if all 10 circs. fail. Now that makes it a
 bit more "involving" because it would be a dynamic maximum depending on
 how many intro points.
 >
 > So two choices, doing that dynamic thingy (not that crazy, there is one
 callsite I believe checking that maximum) or we just say (10 + 2) * 2 is
 our new max per period.
 >
 > Thoughts?

 Do the dynamic maximum - that means we tolerate almost all our connections
 failing in the first 5 minutes, but if they all fail, we wait.

 I pushed two fixups to the branch bug21594_030, which replace the macro
 with a static function.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21594#comment:3>
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