[tor-bugs] #21615 [Metrics/Atlas]: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Mar 2 15:37:36 UTC 2017


#21615: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups
---------------------------+-----------------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks    |          Owner:  irl
     Type:  enhancement    |         Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium         |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal         |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                 |         Points:
 Reviewer:                 |        Sponsor:
---------------------------+-----------------------------------
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Atlas doesn't claim to hash fingerprints and we instead provide
 instructions on how to look up bridges using the hashed fingerprint. I'm
 not convinced this is a defect, as clearly lookups using fingerprints
 work.

 Is Onionoo generally happy to respond to hashed fingerprints in place of
 fingerprints for both relays and bridges then? What is the gain for this
 over the loss that a bridge fingerprint could be entered into the browser
 and perhaps leaked?

 I'm not saying it's a bad idea, I'm saying I'm not sure I understand the
 motivation yet.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21615#comment:1>
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