[tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Jun 27 01:50:06 UTC 2017


#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
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 Reporter:  teor                  |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement           |         Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor          |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                        |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                        |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information


Comment:

 Ok, I added #defines for the consensus params and defaults in a fixup
 commit, but as for using the functions instead of the options directly,
 there is a problem: I don't see an easy way to use the tor2web function,
 because it depends on a #define for NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE. This makes it
 impossible to unit test the behavior unless I rebuild all of Tor (or
 somehow rebuild only the the Tor files that check the NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE
 #define) just for my test.

 Do any other tests rebuild various c files with different #define values
 for cases like this? I didn't see any.. Do we need to write custom
 makefile rules now, or is that just crazy? It seems crazy this late in the
 0.3.1 game for sure, and seems a little crazy generally...

 IMO options validation like this should be done at torrc load time and
 during a control port config update, not at every single use in the
 runtime.

 Given that, I'm inclined to leave it as torrc options only.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17857#comment:27>
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