[tor-bugs] #22702 [Core Tor/Tor]: Never send a consensus which the downloader already has

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Jun 23 23:53:21 UTC 2017


#22702: Never send a consensus which the downloader already has
--------------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  nickm                           |          Owner:  ahf
     Type:  defect                          |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High                            |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                            |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                    |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                          |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay directory regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                  |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                  |        Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--------------------------------------------+------------------------------

Comment (by ahf):

 > Additionally, if somebody says X-Or-Diff-From the consensus which we
 currently have, then instead of telling them "That's up-to-date", we also
 send the current consensus. That's also bad.

 What is meant here by "which we currently have"? Prop#140 allows a client
 to send multiple hashes of the consensuses they have, but our current
 request sending code only ever sends one hash, but our request receive
 path handles multiple hashes (which is according to the proposal).

 Should we check if the `digest_sha3_as_signed` (from `networkstatus_t`)
 in our currently "live" consensus document, of the given client requested
 flavour, matches any one of the set of hashes the client sends to us in
 the `X-Or-Diff-From-Consensus` header - or should we only handle the case
 where a client sends one hash that happens to match the
 `digest_sha3_as_signed`? Or something entirely different?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22702#comment:2>
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