[tor-bugs] #22689 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jun 21 23:21:40 UTC 2017


#22689: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies
------------------------------+-----------------------------------
     Reporter:  teor          |      Owner:
         Type:  defect        |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
    Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal        |   Keywords:  prop224, relay-safety
Actual Points:                |  Parent ID:  #17945
       Points:  0.5           |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                |
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 This prevents them knowing both the service and client IP addresses, and
 therefore being targets for network traffic logging, sybil, or hacking
 attacks.

 We need to implement the following checks:
 * if the introduction point was made using a direct connection (single
 onion services), refuse direct client connections,
 * if the rend point was made using a direct connection (custom client, no
 tor2web for HSv3), refuse direct service connections (single onion
 services).

 See #22668 for how this is done for HSDir3s using channel_is_client(). The
 comments in that patch explain why it works.

 We could even refactor the common code out of
 connection_dir_is_anonymous() into connection_is_anonymous(), and avoid
 including channel[tls].h into directory.c.

 I'm not sure if I will get time to do this, so please feel free to take
 this ticket.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22689>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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