[tor-bugs] #15272 [Core Tor/Tor]: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Jun 16 22:33:03 UTC 2017


#15272: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics
----------------------------------------------+----------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                               |          Owner:
     Type:  task                              |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                              |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                              |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                      |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal                            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, privcount-maybe tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                    |         Points:
                                              |  medium/large
 Reviewer:                                    |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-
                                              |  can
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:15272 asn]:
 > ...
 > Such research questions could be:
 > * Is 6 HSDirs the best number of HSDirs?
 > * How long should HSDirs cache descriptors?

 We may be able to answer these questions using PrivCount HSDir statistics
 (late 2017).

 > * Are IPs stable or are they subject to churn? How often do HSes change
 IPs?

 We may be able to answer this question using PrivCount HSDir statistics,
 but it might require unique counting, which is easier and safer to do in
 the next iteration of the protocol, coming in 2018.

 > * Do we want more preemptive circuits on hidden services?
 > * Do hidden services fail easily because their sole guard fails?

 We can't answer these questions using PrivCount, because it only runs on
 relays.

 > ...

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15272#comment:14>
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