[tor-bugs] #22400 [Core Tor/Tor]: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Jun 16 16:45:37 UTC 2017


#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live
consensus and not enough guards in the state file
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma          |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by nickm):

 Diagnosis:  The "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding" message is a red
 herring; that is talking about a cached unverified consensus, as evidenced
 by the next line, "Couldn't load unverified consensus microdesc
 networkstatus from cache."

 What's actually going on here is that we _are_ accepting a slightly old
 consensus.  The expiration check is:
 {{{
   if (from_cache && !accept_obsolete &&
       c->valid_until < now-OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) {
     log_info(LD_DIR, "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding.");
     goto done;
   }
 }}}
 with the relevant constant defined as
 {{{
 #define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5)
 }}}


 So, one bug here is that a really old unverified consensus got left
 around.  We have a ticket for that from 2011 (#4187)!

 One other bug is that we're expanding our guard sample even though the
 consensus is a few days out of date.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22400#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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