[tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jun 8 00:31:43 UTC 2017


#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
---------------------------+----------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor           |          Owner:
     Type:  defect         |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium         |      Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal         |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900         |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                 |        Sponsor:
---------------------------+----------------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > I think we think we already have exits refuse to be exits if their dns
 isn't working.
 >
 > See check_dns_honesty_callback() and the dns_launch_correctness_checks()
 that it calls.

 Well, maybe we try, but it doesn't work consistently right now.

 In fact, chutney's upcoming offline mode (#21903) will rely on the fact
 that exits without DNS still allow exiting to IP addresses.

 > It looks like it could be improved.

 If we fix this, we need to make sure AllowBrokenDNSConfig actually works.
 Or we need to add an option that maintains the current behaviour, because
 chutney relies on it.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21989#comment:3>
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