[tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Jun 6 00:35:34 UTC 2017


#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-----------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  dcf                          |          Owner:
     Type:  project                      |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz          |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by dcf):

 Using the data from comment:192, here is a visualization of bridge
 bootstrapping from US and KZ over the past few months. For each bridge,
 there is one connection attempt per hour. The dots on the graph show the
 maximum bootstrap percentage reached in each attempt (10% = no
 connectivity, 100% = complete bootstrapping, percentages in the middle
 mean some connectivity but bootstrap didn't complete).

 When the blue dot and the red dot are in the same place, it means that
 there was no extra blocking in KZ. When the blue dot is lower than the red
 dot, it means there was some additional blocking in KZ.

 There are three gaps in the KZ data where there are no measurements: Dec
 28 to January 12, April 8 to April 26, and after May 2.

 [[Image(kz-data-20170605.png)]]

 This table shows the average maximum bootstrap percentage reached during
 the times when ''both'' the US and KZ sites were taking measurements
 (i.e., excluding the gaps mentioned above). What we see from this is that
 the majority of measured bridges are not in fact blocked. The only bridges
 where the KZ rate is lower than the US rate are ndnop3, ndnop5, GreenBelt,
 Lisbeth, and NX01. Bridges that were added more recently, or were never
 used, are not more blocked in KZ. This makes me think that the firewall's
 blocking is based more on a blacklist than on dynamic timing detection.

 {{{#!html
 <table class="wiki">
 <tr><th>bridge</th><th>US average bootstrap %</th><th>KZ average bootstrap
 %</th></tr>
 <tr><td>ndnop3</td><td align=right style="background:
 #EBCAC9">63.33%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #DD918A">20.68%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>ndnop5</td><td align=right style="background:
 #ECCDCC">65.75%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #DD9189">20.53%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>GreenBelt:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #EAC7C6">61.21%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #D9837A">10.21%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>GreenBelt:443</td><td align=right style="background:
 #EAC7C6">61.21%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #DD918A">21.21%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>GreenBelt:5881</td><td align=right style="background:
 #EAC7C6">61.24%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #DD918A">20.86%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>Lisbeth</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.32%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #E4AEAA">42.84%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>NX01:443</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.58%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #E4AFAB">43.50%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>cymrubridge30:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFD">98.93%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>cymrubridge31:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFD">98.94%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>cymrubridge32:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.48%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>cymrubridge33:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F6F9FD">98.38%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFD">98.97%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>frosty:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.04%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>frosty:40035</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F6F9FD">98.42%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>camille:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.26%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>camille:42779</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7F9FD">98.68%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>dragon:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.26%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>dragon:38224</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7F9FD">98.68%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>dimple:80</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFD">98.97%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>dimple:44769</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFF">100.00%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FBFE">99.63%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>unused-cypherpunkskludge</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.61%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F6F8FC">97.70%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>unused-iat0</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.62%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F6F5F8">95.60%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>unused-iat1</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F7FAFE">99.61%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #F6F9FD">98.31%</td></tr>
 <tr><td>unused-iat2</td><td align=right style="background:
 #E6B4B1">47.37%</td><td align=right style="background:
 #E6B5B2">47.92%</td></tr>
 </table>
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20348#comment:193>
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