[tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

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#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  catalyst                             |          Owner:
                                                 |  patrickod
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  continuous-integration ci testing    |  Actual Points:  1
  best-practice unit-testing new-developers      |
  travis review-group-21                         |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  nickm                                |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  .5 => 1


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:21 nickm]:
 > Hi!  I have some questions:
 >   - If we merge this, will it start spamming the #tor-bots IRC?

 It will spam #tor-bots when someone makes a commit which breaks things
 when the commit's parent was previously working, and it will also spam for
 a commit which fixes things when the commit's parent was previously
 broken.  Do we want different behaviour?

 >   - Do we want to consider adding --enable-fragile-hardening?

 We can do that, if that is what we expect to pass. (I think that's a
 reasonable expectation. Also, side note, we should make sure to document
 our expectations in doc/HACKING better!) Added in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/commit/?h=bug22636&id=c91a57ccf90308c6728184b43519f96b61acb95d
 commit] `c91a57ccf9`.

 >   - Should we install the optional dependencies (zstd, lzma2, scrypt,
 ...)

 Sure, done in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/commit/?h=bug22636&id=1bb00fb812c0df7a574ed62e9f53b0e8192c7d04
 commit] `1bb00fb812`. (Except, for some reason, Ubuntu Trusty doesn't have
 a libzstd package available.)

 >   - In the homebrew stanza, should all of those lines have "brew
 outdated openssl" or only the openssl one?

 Oh oops, good catch. Fixed in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/commit/?h=bug22636&id=8f8689f70235dc19cbc5092ea148af5772a9cdc3
 commit] `8f8689f70235`.

 >   - Should we skip rust installation if we won't be building with rust,
 in order to save time?

 Yes, this is a great idea. Done in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/commit/?h=bug22636&id=e5dd07a4c64fd2a4132ab1f6dec64640a95da35e
 commit] `e5dd07a4c64`. It doesn't seem to save any time though, probably
 if I had to guess because there's some transparent proxy setup with a
 cache.

 I've updated `bug22636_0.2.4_squashed` and `bug22636_0.3.1_squashed` and
 tests [https://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/257127758 are]
 [https://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/257126606 passing]
 respectively.

 Replying to [comment:23 nickm]:
 > Oh, one more thing:
 >
 >   --enable-fatal-warnings was called --enable-gcc-warnings before
 0.2.9.x

 Oh right. Thanks! There's now a `bug22636_0.2.9`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug22636_0.2.9
 branch] for 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 which contains everything from the
 `bug22636_0.2.4_squashed` branch, except it uses --enable-gcc-warnings
 instead.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22636#comment:24>
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