[tor-bugs] #18268 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Tor aware of the top-30 destinations of Tor Exit traffic

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#18268: Make Tor aware of the top-30 destinations of Tor Exit traffic
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 Reporter:  naif                            |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement                     |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                          |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                            |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                    |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                          |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount-maybe maybe-bad-idea  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                  |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                  |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > I'm not sure this is a good idea, but if it is, perhaps privcount could
 make it less of a disaster.

 We are considering doing this for PrivCount with the Alexa top 100 (or
 so)[0]. We would have a secure counter for each popular (top-level)
 hostname listed by Alexa. We would not collect any subdomains.

 The final figures would be a secure, noisy aggregate of a week (or more)
 of multiple relays' counts. (The collection protocol is designed so that
 individual relay counts are never made available. No detailed logs are
 produced.)

 As Alexa is focused on web traffic, this would only cover popular web
 domains. (Web is the most common protocol over most Tor exits, unless a
 fully open port policy is used[1].)

 [0]: https://github.com/privcount/privcount/issues/179
 [1]: http://www.robgjansen.com/publications/privcount-ccs2016.pdf

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > What is the use-case / motivation to collect and publish this data?

 It helps us work out which sites we should test in Tor Browser, how we
 should optimise the underlying Tor protocol, and what features are
 important to our users.

 Also, some people are curious about what Tor is used for. So some of them
 perform measurements that are dangerous for users. Others guess based on
 their own ideas of what Tor should be used for. Having accurate, securely
 collected data satisfies people's curiosity without harming users or
 spreading misinformation.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18268#comment:7>
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