[tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Dec 20 08:32:42 UTC 2017
#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
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Reporter: isabela | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: antonela | Sponsor:
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Comment (by gk):
Thanks! I like the idea of getting the circuit display out of the
Torbutton menu and adding it to the doorhanger which is supposed to
show/make accessible all the relevant website information (like TLS state,
permissions etc.).
I think something like version 8 is my favorite right now. My feeling is
we should avoid versions with extra clicks to load new circuits (version 5
and 6) as this gets annoying over time. And having this extra click just
for the first time or until the user opts out seems overkill to me as
well. Additionally, the button should not be "Load a New Circuit" as we
are not loading circuits but web sites. :) And we should not lose the "for
this site" aspect. It's not some arbitrary circuit that gets somehow
deployed: what happens is that the website the user has open in the
focused tab gets loaded over a new circuit. I am also inclined to add just
a "Learn more" link next to the button and skip the guard node related
message. It might confuse users knowing nothing about Tor. And once they
start wondering why the first node rarely changes we have the "i" icon
next to it AND there would still be the "Learn More" link available.
FWIW: "All sessions will be lost" on version five is not true or at least
highly misleading. First of all reloading the website to use a new circuit
is only affecting sessions related to the website in question and not
necessarily "all" (sure if there is just that one open then that statement
is correct). Secondly, depending on how the website is detecting users
it's not inconceivable that changing the circuit does not even affect any
session because login cookies and other state in the browser is
deliberately not touched by this option.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24309#comment:11>
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