[tor-bugs] #23270 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor relays to be configured to block selected hidden services, including racist hate sites

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#23270: Allow Tor relays to be configured to block selected hidden services,
including racist hate sites
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks                          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  racism, hate, anti-fascism,          |  Actual Points:
  probably-bad-idea, slippery-slope,             |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by mikeperry):

 This ticket is an interesting thought experiment. So interesting that I am
 interrupting my vacation to think about it. :)

 Taking the long view here, if such a patch were written, it will only be a
 matter of time before trolls, nazis, or some other subculture decides to
 use it against others. In fact, if I'm someone who lives just to troll
 (*cough* weev *cough*), I'm basically waiting on the edge of my seat for
 this patch to get written (probably even while drooling a bit). I would
 just be ''dying'' to take the patch and advocate that people use for
 censorship of a site that hosts content about
 $RANDOM_TOPIC_TANGENTIALLY_INVOLVING_JEWISH_CULTURE_SOMEHOW. It's just how
 that twisted motherfucker rolls.

 So while it may be fun to think about doing something like this to ruin
 weev's and some Nazis day, really we should be considering any such patch
 as a red team exercise to strengthen the Tor network against further
 censorship. v3 hidden services will make such a thing harder because of
 shared randomness, but I bet there are still nasty behaviors wrt how
 clients react to HSDIRs that misbehave upon requests for descriptors
 (timeouts, corruption, stalling, and such). We should all be collectively
 looking for these issues, and fixing them ASAP so that clients are not
 impacted (or even delayed) when malicious relays behave in this way.

 So, IMO: Patches welcome. So it goes. Let it play. And so on.
 [https://everything2.com/title/There+is+no+enemy+anywhere There Is No
 Enemy Anywhere.]

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23270#comment:26>
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