[tor-bugs] #3733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time out

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Aug 24 19:58:00 UTC 2017


#3733: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time
out
-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------
 Reporter:  rransom                      |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                       |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                         |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                 |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #17242 => #23300


Comment:

 Switching parent so we can close #17242.

 (Only speaking v3):

 `CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND` is handled properly, if it's open and
 passes its cutoff, it will get expired.

 `CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY` is '''not''' handled properly I believe. An
 intro and rend circuit are linked together when the client sends an
 INTRODUCE1 cell that is when the `rendezvous_cookie` is copied from the
 rend circuit `hs_ident` to the intro circuit one. Once they are linked
 together, the rend circuit is closed by any error on the intro circuit
 side.

 `CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED` is handled properly, same exact
 cutoff check as the establish rend purpose but then it is flagged has
 `hs_circ_has_timed_out`.

 So all in all, we need to handle correctly the rend ready purpose for a v3
 service and we should have this fixed.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3733#comment:23>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list