[tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Sep 3 01:08:21 UTC 2016


#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  teor
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608,     |  Actual Points:  11.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review-     |
  group-7                                        |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet                              |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by nickm):

 Two more concerns that just occurred to me:

   1. Should the 'poisoning' feature work in both directions?  It seems to
 me that the damage from accidentally making an anonymous hidden service
 non-anonymous would be much much greater than the danger of accidentally
 anonymizing something that you didn't mean to anonymize.

   2. I anticipate that if all the options for making RSOS start with
 "OnionService" and all of the options for making anonymous onions services
 start with "HiddenService", then people will call RSOS "onion services"
 and continue to call anonymous onion services "hidden services." That's
 probably not what we had in mind.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:76>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


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