[tor-bugs] #20262 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services startup time always gets revealed

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Oct 11 16:18:13 UTC 2016


#20262: Onion services startup time always gets revealed
-----------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  twim             |          Owner:
     Type:  defect           |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium           |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor     |        Version:
 Severity:  Major            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs research  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                   |         Points:
 Reviewer:                   |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-----------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Why do you say that is the plan? Who decided it? Enough is enough of
 trying to launder orders from bloodthirsty external US military people as
 rational community decisions.

 Hm, this escalated quickly here.

 When I say this is the plan, I meant that this is my opinion, and it also
 aligns with the opinion of other devs when we discussed it in Seattle.

 In a few words, I think that a deterministic 30s delay offers absolutely
 nothing in terms of security, and it actually harms reachability for some
 use cases (e.g. onionshare). So I think reducing it from deterministic 30s
 to deterministic 0s changes nothing in terms of security, and actually
 improves Tor performance.

 Now, if we think that ''probablistic'' delays actually offer something in
 terms of security, I'd like someone to do a proper security analysis of
 what they offer, and how long the delays will be.

 You disagree? Please make your point but also include a '''convincing'''
 security analysis. Personally, I don't take orders from external US
 military people, and who knows this might even include yourself.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20262#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list