[tor-bugs] #18809 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu May 19 12:16:22 UTC 2016


#18809: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  teor
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
 Priority:  Medium                               |  merge_ready
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |      Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal                               |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,              |        Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1,   must-     |  0.2.8.1-alpha
  fix-before-0283                                |     Resolution:
Parent ID:                                       |  Actual Points:  4
 Reviewer:  andrea                               |         Points:  3
                                                 |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  SponsorS-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by nickm):

 In connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
    * I hate making this function more complex.  It is already far too
 complex.  But I won't hold off the patch for that.

 Here's a case I needed to think about:
 {{{
 + * As soon as we have received a consensus, return 0, even if we don't
 have
 + * enough certificates to validate it. */
 }}}

 Suppose that a fallback gives us a bogus consensus whose certificates are
 all bad.  When will we notice, throw the consensus away, and try to fetch
 another one?  Having a comment that explains the process here would ease
 my mind, and the mind of the next person who tries to read the code. :)

 Merging and applying roger's spelling fixes.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18809#comment:33>
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