[tor-bugs] #8908 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor systemd socket activation support

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#8908: Tor systemd socket activation support
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks                          |          Owner:  intgr
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
 Priority:  Very Low                             |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |      Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal                               |  unspecified
 Keywords:  tor-relay, systemd, lorax,           |        Version:  Tor:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch    |  0.2.7
Parent ID:                                       |     Resolution:
 Reviewer:                                       |  Actual Points:
                                                 |         Points:  small
                                                 |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:23 nickm]:
 > So, these two main questions from above still sit in my mind:
 > > * Does it actually work to only start Tor when Tor receives a
 SocksPort or ControlPort request? When Tor first starts after significant
 downtime, it needs to download a pretty big amount of directory data, and
 build enough circuits for user traffic. Does that happen fast enough to
 answer the request that made systemd launch Tor?
 > > * A Tor is _supposed_ to actually turn itself nearly off when it sees
 no user traffic. Does your need for this feature mean that feature is not
 working?
 >
 > I'm thinking that because of the latter point, it might be a better idea
 to work on #2149 than on this, since #2149 has more general applicability.

 Note that I'm not the OP, just a passer-by.

 For me, systemd socket activation would serve the purpose of on-
 demand/lazy startup, rather than setting up the system to start Tor as
 soon as Internet access has been established. My use-case is a laptop that
 could potentially connect to the Internet from a variety of geographical
 locations and network access routes. This would solve the real or
 perceived privacy or security problem of connecting, or at least
 attempting to connect, to the Tor network at certain times and places, as
 it would only connect to the network when actually used, whether through a
 Tor-enabled web browser or torify or whatever other Tor-using application.
 It could also be a problem for metered bandwidth connections.

 Maybe I'm just misinformed about Tor's startup procedure, or maybe I
 should be using traffic obfuscation features. If these are legitimate
 concerns then they are orthogonal to #2149 (although metered bandwidth
 seems related). Right now it is a minor inconvenience to manually start
 the Tor service prior to launching a Tor-using application.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8908#comment:24>
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