[tor-bugs] #17945 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services

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#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
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 Reporter:  teor                        |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement                 |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, sos, tor2web, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                              |         Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:                              |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > Replying to [ticket:17945 teor]:
 > > Tor2Web clients make a one-hop connection to the rendezvous point.
 Rendezvous Single Onion Services also make a one-hop connection to the
 rendezvous point. (Single Onion Services expect a client to make an extend
 request to the Single Onion Service at the end of a 3-hop path.)
 > The rendezvous point (and possibly the introduction point) could
 terminate the connection if it has a single hop on both ends. This seems
 to be the most correct option.

 This could result in false positives if the consensus gets out of sync.
 Or is there a reliable way for a relay to detect non-relays without using
 the consensus?
 (How does the padding do it?)

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:8>
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