[tor-bugs] #15937 [Tor]: Clients fail on the 7th rapid SOCKS request to the same HS

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Mar 14 16:08:02 UTC 2016


#15937: Clients fail on the 7th rapid SOCKS request to the same HS
--------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor    |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect  |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low     |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor     |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:          |         Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:          |        Sponsor:  SponsorR
--------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:22 nickm]:
 > hm, that seems easy.  Thanks also for the comment. Two questions:
 >
 >    * Is there any reason that rend_client_fetch_v2_desc() could fail
 other than already having 6 directory connections?  If so the check should
 turn into `if ret < 0`, right?

 Yes it can fail for other reasons but since
 `rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc()` is a void function, there is not much
 we can do if it does fail. The appropriate logs will be displayed though.

 >
 >    * Yes, please open that other bug.

 On my stack.

 >
 >    * Do we really want to open a number of directory fetches that
 depends on how many client requests we got at once?  That behavior seems
 kind of weird.  If you agree, please open a bug for 0.2.9?

 Indeed. We shouldn't do that much requests (unless some historical reasons
 made us do that). I think it should be only 2 or 3 (max half) in parallel
 and once we have the descriptor, close the pending ones. That's actually
 the behavior with introduction points.

 I'll open a bug for 029 and if it's not what we want in the end, we'll
 comment there. Thx!

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15937#comment:23>
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