[tor-bugs] #11327 [Tor]: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they don't measure

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun Jan 31 16:47:22 UTC 2016


#11327: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they
don't measure
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  arma                                 |          Owner:  TvdW
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
 Priority:  High                                 |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor                                  |      Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal                               |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-auth, 026-triaged-1,             |        Version:  Tor:
  027-triaged-1-in                               |  0.2.7
Parent ID:                                       |     Resolution:
  Sponsor:  SponsorU                             |  Actual Points:
                                                 |         Points:
                                                 |  small/medium
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by TvdW):

 A while ago someone (I think arma/nickm) mentioned we should look into
 whether we can simply disable Fast/Guard voting if an authority doesn't
 have enough measurements yet.

 After implementing this thought and testing it it turns out this may not
 be a good idea: the network would lose all fast/guard flags if there are
 insufficient bandwidth authorities. Also, Chutney would stop working.

 I think this is better handled on a consensus method level, or we could
 choose to get rid of the Fast flag completely and have the client
 determine it instead.

 In any case, I think having the authorities take data from a previous
 consensus is not the correct solution to this problem.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11327#comment:16>
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