[tor-bugs] #18054 [Tor]: Decide how to proceed with torrc options for proposal 224

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jan 13 10:16:46 UTC 2016


#18054: Decide how to proceed with torrc options for proposal 224
-----------------------------+----------------------------
     Reporter:  dgoulet      |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal       |   Keywords:  tor-hs prop224
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:  #12424
       Points:               |    Sponsor:  SponsorR
-----------------------------+----------------------------
 With next-gen HS, we'll have both new and legacy system running in
 parallel. However, we should encourage as much as possible the adoption of
 the new system when setting up a new hidden service.

 From a torrc perspective, we should probably use the same options as we
 have now but making tor code a bit more smarter when parsing them. One
 idea would be to add an option that indicates if the user wants the legacy
 protocol or not:

 Something that could look like:
 {{{
     HiddenServiceLegacy 1
     HiddenServiceDir <PATH>
     HiddenServicePort ...
 }}}

 And `HiddenServiceLegacy` by default would be 0. This option should be
 deprecated over time.

 Another possibility is NOT having this config option and only if
 "private_key" file exists in the `HiddenServiceDir` and it's `RSA1024`, we
 switch to legacy. Without it, we go next-gen. So in other words, we DO NOT
 let a user setup a legacy HS unless she has a key for it placed in the HS
 directory. This will allow current HS setup to still work after upgrade
 and not make operators add an extra option.

 Basically, the key type would be our heuristic to switch from legacy to
 next-gen.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18054>
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