[tor-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

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#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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 Reporter:  ioerror                       |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement                   |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                          |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser                   |        Version:
 Severity:  Critical                      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                |         Points:
  Sponsor:                                |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:166 jgrahamc]:
 > Replying to [comment:163 cypherpunks]:
 > > Thank you for the new possibility to whitelist Tor, jgrahamc.
 > >
 > > An argument I have often seen raised, acknowledged, but then silently
 dropped over the last year was the one of the read only option, though.
 The arguments made for delivering the contents via onion services were
 sound as well. If Facebook can do it why shouldn't you?
 >
 > On the R/O mode I'm mostly opposed to working on it because I've got X
 engineering resources and I'd rather spend them on a solution that allows
 legitimate Tor users 'normal' access to the web and not some special mode.
 I think Tor users are better off and CloudFlare a stronger company if I do
 that.

 Of course we all want the perfect solution in happy rainbow land, but
 let's face it, allowing read-only of the cache will take about 5% of the
 resources that the "proper" solution would take and make 95% of users
 happy. I would consider this a good first step in the right direction. It
 would also take a lot of pressure from the recaptcha issues, and might
 rather increase the elasticity in your resource planning instead of
 occupying more resources.


 > We've debating internally offering .onion addresses to our customers
 and/or running exit nodes just for our customer base. Currently there's no
 work happening on this but neither are out of the question (they've just
 tended to get prioritized far down the list).

 That sounds promising. Maybe a collaboration with Tor developers is an
 option here? They also have priority lists, but I guess the Cloudflare
 issues are rather higher on their list than the Tor issues on yours.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:180>
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