[tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

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#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                            |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                         |         Status:
                                           |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                         |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                           |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                   |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                         |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, triage-out-030-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                 |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                 |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-------------------------------------------+-------------------------------
Changes (by s7r):

 * cc: s7r (added)


Comment:

 Recently got this message (16 December 2016 and respectively 18 December
 2016) 3 times on 0.2.9.6-rc, so it's still happening.

 Branch `bug15618_030-testing` in dgoulet's repo includes a patch that will
 help us confirm or infirm the theory described at comment:8 . I have
 compiled that branch and hardcoded the relay running it as RP, but can't
 properly test it at this time because of #21056 so we'll have to wait
 little more, I'll revert with results after.

 The problem is the message:
 {{{
 [warn] BLAM. Circuit has_opened() called 3 times.
 }}}
 is logged on the '''client''' instance when trying to open more ( > 1 )
 concurrent connections to the same onion service with the same (hardcoded)
 RP but different circuits because requests are sent with socks username /
 password isolation. Nothing unusual on the '''relay''' instance - no
 warnings at all.

 Having the log at debug level on client instance I was able to see that
 the hardcoded RP is in majority of circuits hop number 4 which means
 cannibalization, because the RP counted from client side should be hop
 number 3, right?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:17>
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