[tor-bugs] #7349 [Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  asn      |      Owner:  isis
         Type:  project  |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-bridge SponsorZ tor-pt
Actual Points:           |  proposal-needed 028-triage
       Points:  9000+    |  Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:13 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 elypter]:
 > > why not ditch the orport alltogether. if all relays communicate over
 pluggable transports then active probing will become obsolete.
 >
 > This is about making the ORPort "ditchable".  However, it is ''not''
 about making bridges communicate to the next hop over PTs, since that
 would reveal that they are a bridge (and thus nullify most of the work I
 did for #7144).

 It's also pointless extra overhead, unless we're talking about using a PT
 protocol instead of TLS.  At the moment this would be a horrible idea
 because the closest thing to a PT protocol that provides the reuired
 security properties is `obfs4`, and it wasn't designed as a TLS
 replacement.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7349#comment:19>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online