[tor-bugs] #17159 [Pluggable transport]: Deploy the PT reachability tests on some centralised system which reports to BridgeDB/BridgeAuth

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Sep 25 10:16:37 UTC 2015


#17159: Deploy the PT reachability tests on some centralised system which reports
to BridgeDB/BridgeAuth
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  isis                                 |          Owner:  isis
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  major                                |      Milestone:
Component:  Pluggable transport                  |        Version:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, bridgedb, bridgeauth,    |  Actual Points:
  bridge-reachability, pt                        |         Points:
Parent ID:                                       |
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 We need PT reachability tests for all bridges once #7349 is complete, or
 much preferably before.

 I propose we deploy the solution from #6396 on some new, separate machine
 which reports to BridgeDB or the BridgeAuth.

 For reporting purposes, I also propose we define a better (e.g. more
 future-proof) system for specifying ''which'' PT instance we are talking
 about for which bridge. In general, it should be capable of handling:
  * Both RSA and Ed25519 relay identity fingerprints/keys,
  * Multiple instances of the same PT (#11211),
  * Specifying which transport is/was/should be running

 Basically, I expect this to (nearly?) be the full PT bridge line. Should
 it include PT args?  E.g. the `cert=` field for obfs4? (Perhaps it would
 be simplest to just define it as the full bridge line that BridgeDB would
 give out, to reduce code duplication and parsing.)

 I also propose that the set of PTs which are used to test are the same PTs
 which are, by default, bundled in Tor Browser. (Should we use the set from
 alpha or stable?) E.g. if your bridge is only running the `snarggleblarf`
 PT and has no ORPort, and TB doesn't know what the `snarggleblarf` PT is,
 then for the purposes of the test, we've no idea if your bridge is Running
 or not.

 Lastly, what does it mean if a bridge without an ORPort, and running
 `obfs3`, `fte`, and `obfs4`, is found to only be reachable via `obfs4`?
 Does this bridge still get the `Running` flag from the BridgeAuth? Should
 there be some per-bridge-line `Running` flag? If this data is reported to
 the BridgeAuth, how will the BridgeAuth communicate it to BridgeDB (so
 that BridgeDB knows what to hand out)?

 '''Related: #5211, #13589'''

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17159>
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