[tor-bugs] #7349 [Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

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#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
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     Reporter:  asn      |      Owner:  isis
         Type:  project  |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-bridge SponsorZ tor-pt
Actual Points:           |  proposal-needed 028-triage
       Points:  9000+    |  Parent ID:
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Changes (by isis):

 * points:   => 9000+


Comment:

 Adding over nine thousand points, meaning something like "The size of this
 ticket is large and will require more than one week of work."

 In actuality, I estimate this will take a month (or possibly more) work,
 once the following (prerequisite) tasks are factored in:

  * Discuss other ways for the BridgeAuth to conduct reachability testing
 (#5211, #13589?; related to #7144 anti-enumeration defenses and
 prop!#188).
  * Write a proposal for this ticket.
  * Probably deploy something like #6396 on BridgeDB or some other
 centralised system which reports to BridgeDB/BridgeAuth. We'd also need to
 be able to do bridge bandwidth testing over PTs, since the ORPort would be
 gone.
  * Hack on this ticket.
  * Revise various specs/proposals.
  * Review changes, rinse, repeat.
  * Merge.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7349#comment:16>
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