[tor-bugs] #17067 [Tor]: useful cover traffic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17067: useful cover traffic
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 Reporter:  elypter  |          Owner:
     Type:  project  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor      |        Version:
 Keywords:           |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:           |         Points:
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 if an adversary is sniffing between client and entry guard and between
 exit relay and destination server he can do traffic correlation in both
 directions. one way of hiding returning traffic could be to let the middle
 relay send cover traffic to lets say 5 random entry guards as soon as it
 recieves returning traffic. the entry guards send that traffic to one of
 their clients. the adversary would not be able to know who of the 6 people
 recieved data from that server. while still being a large amount of
 overhead its not as much as maxing out all connections. for sending
 traffic thats not as exit relays would have to send something to random
 servers. instead the client upload bandwidth could be reduced and the
 client could send constant low bandwith cover stream.

 this cover bandwidth could then be used for many useful things like:

 -provide a decentralized private cloud storage
 -spread metadata and tor updates
 -allow download content or embedded media on onion sites to be hosted in
 an anonymous high lattency p2p network
 -website archive
 -mail service

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17067>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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