[tor-bugs] #17031 [general]: hardware tor relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17031: hardware tor relay
-------------------------+-----------------
     Reporter:  elypter  |      Owner:
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
    Component:  general  |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-----------------

Comment (by elypter):

 Replying to [comment:1 kernelcorn]:
 > Even if the hardware prevented an attacker from manipulating Tor traffic
 at an application level,
 there are no practical ways to hack into 100% signed hardware that is
 protected on the chip layer. you would have to do microprobing to get the
 private key. and there are probably enough ways to prevent this by adding
 mechanical or chemical self destruction.

 > they could still run your encrypted hardware and wiretap Tor traffic
 flowing in and out of the device. If they gained enough traffic, they
 could still carry out many types of passive and active attacks upstream of
 your devices, which would be damaging to the Tor network.
 what kind of active attacks besides ddosing (which could be done by anyone
 anywhere) should that be if relays only accept correctly encrypted
 traffic?

 the passive attacks are something that i expected to be solved before.
 there are many ways this could be achieved like route defined delays,
 cover traffic(eg a webserver on same device or mixing the low latency with
 high latency traffic like filesharing within the tor network)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17031#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online