[tor-bugs] #15254 [Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  reopened
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  SponsorR tor-hs stats
   Resolution:           |  TorCoreTeam201509 PostFreeze027
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 As evidenced by the the fact that very few relays have these enabled, the
 vast majority of relay operators are either unaware of these statistics,
 or having been made aware of them, have chosen not to enable them. Even
 software without a specific purpose of giving people more privacy asks
 users before gathering statistics on them. There is no benefit to the
 users on whom the statistics are being collected without notification,
 knowledge, or agreement, from either of these measurements, which are
 measured and published per-relay, not in aggregate. The existing bandwidth
 statistics are already dangerous in terms of guard discovery (#13988) and
 combining them with the statistics in this ticket enables easier attacks.
 There is no kind of privacy policy to notify users, as is required by (at
 least) EU law.

 Finally, it hasn't been publicly explained anywhere what benefit, if any,
 there is to anyone, even DARPA, of increasing the precision of these
 statistics. What purpose are the current measurements from a limited
 number of relays are too noisy for, that less noisy ones won't be?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online